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ABSTRACT: Recently, a new class of artifacts has appeared in our environment:
complex, high technology work domains. An important characteristic of such
systems is that their goal-relevant properties cannot be directly observed by the
unaided eye. As a result, interface design is a ubiquitous problem in the design of
these work environments. Nevertheless, the problem is one which has yet to be
addressed in an adequate manner. An analogy to human perceptual mechanisms
suggests that a smart instrument approach to interface design is needed to
supplant the rote instrument (single-sensor-single-indicator) approach that has
dominated to this point. Ecological Interface Design (EID) is a theoretical framework
in the smart instrument vein that postulates a set of general, prescriptive principles
for design. The goal of EID is twofold: first, to reveal the affordances of the work
domain through the interface in such a way as to take advantage of the powerful
capabilities of perception and action; and second, to provide the appropriate
computer support for the comparatively more laborious process of problem solving.
An example of the application of the EID framework is presented in the context of a
thermal-hydraulic system. The various steps in the design process are illustrated,
showing how the abstract principles of EID can be applied in a prescriptive manner
to develop a concrete design product. An important outcome of this discussion is
the novel application of Rasmussen's means-end hierarchy to structure the
affordances of an ecosystem. The means-end hierarchy is a generic framework for
describing goal-oriented systems with many degrees of freedom, and therefore
represents a useful addition to the conceptual framework of ecological psychology.
All sorts of instruments have been devised for mediating apprehension. Some
optical instruments merely enhance the information that vision is ready to pick up;
others ... require some inference; still others ... demand a complex chain of
inferences. Some measuring instruments are closer to perception than others.
(Gibson, 1979, p. 260)
The process operator lives in a complex world. The information presented to him is a
code for the physical, dynamical process in the interior of the plant. He is able to ...
operate on the physical meaning of the symbols by rational deductive reasoning.
During frequent routine tasks, however, .... he may be able to improvise rapidly ... if
he is allowed to break down ... the information patterns into familiar generic units.
This is only possible if he can control the process directly - the display system
therefore should be 'transparent' and the physical process should be directly
'touchable' on the control desk. (Rasmussen, 1974, p. 11)
                                      
1In: Ecological Psychology, 1990, 2(3), 207-249.
2INTRODUCTION
During the last 20 years, a new class of artifacts has appeared in our
environment: complex, high technology work domains. Typical examples are
nuclear power plants, emergency response centers, flexible manufacturing
systems, air traffic control centers, and intensive care units. The number of
people who either work in these places or are exposed to their effects (both
positive and negative) is considerable enough that complex human-machine
systems are a significant component of our contemporary ecology. While these
systems provide new technical capabilities that were never before possible, they
also create a new set of problems for their operators. Evolution has provided
people with the capabilities required to survive in the natural environment, but
those capabilities are not necessarily the most desirable ones for coping with
the demands of high technology work domains.
The field of cognitive engineering has emerged in an effort to deal with this
class of applied problems (cf. Norman, 1981; Rasmussen, 1986). In very general
terms, cognitive engineers are concerned with designing safe and reliable high
technology systems by giving appropriate consideration to the capabilities and
limitations of the human element in the system. Thus, cognitive engineering
can be considered as a human factors approach that is specifically tailored to
complex human-machine systems. Overviews of the field are provided by
Hollnagel and Woods (1983), Norman (1986), Rasmussen and Goodstein (1988),
and Woods and Roth (1988), while collections of specific studies can be found
in Goodstein, Andersen, and Olsen (1988), Hollnagel, Mancini, and Woods
(1986, 1988), Rasmussen, Duncan, and Leplat (1987), Rasmussen and Rouse
(1981), and Sheridan and Johannsen (1976).
The subject of this paper is interface design, a particularly important
cognitive engineering issue, which, perhaps surprisingly, has yet to be treated
in a satisfactory manner. Several aspects of interface design for complex work
domains are directly relevant to ecological psychology, and it is the aim of this
paper to point these out. First, there are significant conceptual parallels
between cognitive engineering and ecological theory, particularly the similarity
between the study of smart perceptual instruments and the design of "smart"
interfaces. Second, the problem of interface design provides a new context for
testing existing ecological theories of event perception and action. Third, and
perhaps most importantly, the applied problems with which cognitive
engineering is concerned also pose fundamental psychological questions. These
basic research issues provide a set of challenges that can serve as a catalyst for
extending the scope of ecological psychology.
3The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, a brief description
of the characteristics of complex work domains will serve to outline the general
context of concern to cognitive engineers. In the second section, a set of
implications for interface design will be derived from an analogy to perceptual
instruments. To anticipate, the conclusion will be that a smart instrument
approach to interface design is required. Third, a framework for structuring the
affordances of a work domain, called a means-end hierarchy, will be described.
In addition, several other potential applications of the means-end hierarchy
that are pertinent to ecological psychology will be suggested. The fourth section
will show how the preceding arguments lead to a novel theoretical framework,
called Ecological Interface Design (EID). Fifth and finally, a detailed application
of the principles of EID will be presented in the context of a thermal-hydraulic
process control system. The intent is to illustrate how the general principles of
EID can be instantiated to develop a concrete design product.
THE PROBLEMS OF COGNITIVE ENGINEERING
Complex, High Technology Work Domains
Complex work environments, or domains, possess several characteristics which
have important implications for the demands that they place on their operators
(cf. Perrow, 1984; Rasmussen and Vicente, in press; Sheridan, 1987; Woods,
1988). First, these systems are dynamic and tend to have long time constants;
events evolve much more slowly than in the natural environment. Because
feedback is delayed, the perception-action loop cannot be continuously
maintained, and operators will have to rely on a qualitatively different type of
control strategy (e.g., Crossman and Cooke, 1974; Veldhuyzen and Stassen,
1976). Second, there is also a high degree of risk in complex work domains,
since inappropriate control actions can have catastrophic consequences. This
suggests that operators may have to evaluate carefully the consequences of
their actions based on a conceptual understanding of system functioning before
actually implementing those actions. This will be particularly critical in
abnormal (i.e., fault) situations. Third, complex work domains also tend to be
composed of many subsystems that are highly coupled. This makes it very
difficult to predict all of the effects of a control action, or to trace all of the
implications of a fault since there are many, perhaps diverging, propagation
paths. Fourth, complex human-machine systems are highly automated. Most of
the time, automated control loops regulate the system, and the operator's
responsibility is to monitor the state of the system. Thus, the operator's
demands are primarily perceptual and cognitive in nature, rather than
4psychomotor. Fifth, there tends to be uncertainty in the data that is available to
operators. Because of this impoverished input, the data from the interface does
not always uniquely specify the state of the system. Quite often, there will be a
need for complex problem solving (i.e., to "go beyond the information given").
Finally, if this were not enough, operators are also responsible for dealing with
fault situations. It is their responsibility to improvise and adapt to the
contingencies of an abnormal event, quickly to ensure system safety. Since
their normal control procedures no longer apply in these cases, operators must
generate an appropriate response based on a conceptual understanding of the
system.
The inventory of properties listed above, and their associated implications,
pose an enormous burden on operators and designers. The job of the operators
is particularly unenviable, since they must cope with all these demands on-line,
in real time. While there is certainly a prominent place for direct perception in
the control of these systems, it is important to realize that, due to the large
degree of complexity, operators will also have to rely on problem solving
(Rasmussen and Vicente, 1989, in press), particularly when faults occur. In
order to effectively carry out these activities, the operator must have
comprehensive information about system state and accurate knowledge of
system structure and functioning.
A design challenge arises because contemporary human-machine systems
are qualitatively different in nature from traditional work domains. Classic work
domains (those which traditional human factors practices have been tailored to)
are less complex in that they do not share all of the properties listed above
(Rasmussen, 1988a; Rasmussen and Vicente, in press). Because complex work
domains pose a new set of challenges, new methods and principles are required
for system design (Hollnagel, 1983; Rasmussen, 1988a; Woods, O'Brien, and
Hanes, 1987).
Interface Design
There is another characteristic of complex systems that is of prime importance.
Because of the very nature of the systems being controlled, the goal-relevant
properties of the work domain usually cannot be directly observed by the
unaided eye1 (e.g., the thermodynamic heat engine cycle in a power plant). For
the most part, it will not be possible for operators to go out and directly explore
the status of the system using the powerful perceptual systems that serve them
                                      
1This paper will only be concerned with visual interfaces.  While there may be much to be gained by exploiting
other perceptual modalities in interface design, comparatively little work has been done in this area (but see Blattner,
Sumikawa, and Greenberg, 1989 and Gaver, 1986, 1989 for some interesting ideas on auditory display design).
Thus, the design of multi-modal interfaces remains a topic for future research.
5so well in the natural environment. As a result, the control room interface
(which includes controls, displays, and alarms) must serve as operators'
"window" to the work domain, providing them with a mediating representation
of the system. Thus, interface design is a ubiquitous problem in the design of
complex systems. Yet, it still has not been addressed in a satisfactory manner
(DeBor and Swezey, 1989). There is an obvious and immediate need for a
prescriptive set of principles that will guide designers in developing effective
interfaces for complex work domains.
What role should an interface play in high technology systems? Since the
interface serves as the basis for perception, it should provide as rich a source of
information regarding system status, structure, and function as possible. Can
concepts from ecological psychology help in attaining this objective?
TWO TYPES OF INSTRUMENTS
On the surface, cognitive engineering and ecological psychology may seem to be
concerned with very different types of questions. What does the design of
interfaces, for instance, have to do with the study of event perception and
action? If one considers perception as a measurement process, then these two
areas no longer seem so remote. Perhaps, understanding how perception of the
natural environment takes place can lead to insights into how to design
effective interfaces for complex work domains.
Rote Instruments
Given the view of perception as a measurement process, the organism's
perceptual systems can be considered as a set of measurement instruments
(Rosen, 1978; Runeson, 1977; Pattee, 1986; see Greene, 1982 for a related
discussion on action instruments for motor control). In an influential paper,
Runeson (1977) makes the distinction between rote and smart instruments. As
it turns out, this distinction is as relevant to interface design as it is to
perception.
Rote instruments consist of a large number of a few basic types of meters,
each of which performs a rather simple task. An example is a ruler, which
measures a fundamental dimension, length. The advantage of rote instruments
is that they can be used to derive a variety of different properties. For example,
a ruler can be used to measure length, area, and volume. The disadvantage of
rote instruments is that, in order to derive more complex properties, the
observer must know the rules for combining the elemental measurements. For
instance, to derive the area of a triangle with a ruler, the measuring agent must
know the appropriate formula. In addition, calculations are also required for
6the derivation of the higher order property of interest. In the case of biological
systems, these computations may require considerable effort, and in fact, the
computations may exceed the organism's capabilities or the time available for
effective action.Runeson (1977) argues that the metaphor of rote instruments is
not a very appropriate one for perception. For a goal-directed organism, the
most important properties of the environment likely will be complex, higher-
order dimensions that are directly relevant to the immediate goals, not the
fundamental dimensions of physics. For example, it is more important for a
person to know whether a certain object affords sitting than to know the exact
dimensions of the object. The suggestion is that measurement with rote
instruments would be very inefficient, if not intractable. Returning to the sitting
example, it would be very difficult for an observer armed only with a ruler to
determine whether a given object was indeed sit-onable or not. In addition to
the extensive knowledge of geometry, a very large number of calculations would
also be necessary, requiring a great deal of effort and time.A rote instrument
approach to interface design also has a considerable number of drawbacks. In
fact, such an approach already exists and it represents the traditional manner
in which interfaces for complex systems have been designed. The philosophy
has been referred to as the single-sensor-single-indicator (SSSI) approach
(Goodstein, 1981). Basically, it consists of displaying all of the elemental data
that are directly available from sensors. Anything and everything that can be
directly measured has a single display element associated with it. There are
many disadvantages to such an approach (cf. Goodstein, 1981; Woods, in
press), some of which are identical to those associated with rote instruments.
The most important drawback is related to controllability. In order to
consistently deal with the entire range of domain demands (particularly fault
situations), operators need comprehensive information regarding system state.
But with the SSSI approach, only data that are directly obtained from sensors
are displayed. Thus, higher-order state information which cannot be directly
measured, but which is nevertheless needed to cope with many fault situations,
may not be made available to operators. In fault situations, it is generally not
possible to derive the higher-order properties from the elemental data, and so
operators may not have all of the information that is required to consistently
control the system under these circumstances.
The disadvantages of the SSSI approach are not limited to fault scenarios.
Even under normal operating conditions, SSSI interfaces put an excessive
burden on operators. In these situations, it is, in principle at least, possible to
recover the higher-order, goal relevant domain properties from the elemental
data represented in the interface. The problem, of course, is that considerable
effort and knowledge are required of the operator to carry out this derivation.
7Not only are the higher-order properties not directly displayed, but in addition,
the relationships between the various elemental display elements are also
usually not represented in the interface.
Finally, there is also the issue of information pickup. Just because the
information is in the interface does not mean that the operator can find it easily
(Woods, in press). In the SSSI approach, the form in which information is
usually presented (e.g., similar looking analog meters, or digital numerical
displays) is not very compatible with the capabilities of the human perceptual
system, thereby hindering the process of information extraction. Each
instrument tends to be presented individually, and there is virtually no
integration or nesting of display elements. This makes it difficult for operators
to perceive the state of the system, even if all of the requisite information is in
the interface1.
It is important to note that the SSSI philosophy can also be instantiated with
computer-based displays, so the problems associated with rote instruments are
not necessarily avoided by merely switching from hard-wired meters to
computer-based displays (Woods, in press). A fundamentally different approach
to interface design is required.
The disadvantages of a rote instrument approach to interface design become
intuitively apparent through a simple thought experiment. What if one were to
take a simple every-day task, and develop a single-sensor-single-indicator
interface for it? How difficult would it be to perform the task? Take the case of
tying your shoes for instance. Imagine that, instead of being able to grasp the
laces with your hands, you have to issue commands to a pair of robotic arms
via a command language on a standard typewriter keyboard. (Recall that in
complex systems, the process cannot be directly manipulated nor observed). In
addition, imagine that you cannot directly view the center of activity. Instead,
you have 15 analogue, moving coil meters that separately indicate the x, y, z
coordinates of: each shoelace, each robotic arm, and the shoe. Call this the
single-sensor-single-indicator approach to shoe tying. The example, illustrated
in Figure 1, is obviously exaggerated to make a point, but there are in fact
many parallels between the single-sensor-single-indicator approach to shoe
tying and traditional approaches to interface design for complex systems. If the
                                      
1The problem of information pickup is compounded by the fact that there are so many data available, only a
small subset of which is relevant for any given context.  This leads to what Woods (1986; in press) refers to as the
significance of data problem.  The operator must determine which data are relevant for the current context.  The
problem of context sensitivity will not be discussed in this paper, but the interested reader is referred to Woods
(1984) for a discussion of techniques for directing the operator's attention to the most relevant part of the display, to
Woods (in press) and Mitchell and Miller (1986) for discussions of the problem of context sensitivity, and to
Mitchell and Saisi (1987) and Woods and Elias (1988) for implementations of context sensitive interfaces.  These
efforts complement the ideas described in the present paper.
8task seems difficult with this interface, imagine the additional problems that
crop up if the "operator" had to deal with faults! How easy would it be to "see"
that one's shoelace had broken? Would it be possible to feed the broken lace
through the eyelet to even out the length of the lace ends, thereby making it
possible to perform the task? Needless to say, this approach makes the task of
shoe tying enormously more difficult than the everyday method. The point is
that this conclusion is just as valid for complex work domains: current
interfaces make the operator's job much more difficult than it need be.
Of course, we do not mean to imply that the difficulty associated with control
of these complex systems can be reduced to that of tying one's shoes. This is
clearly not possible. Controlling a power plant, for example, is a very difficult
business. The point of the example is that the interface should not contribute to
the difficulty of the task (cf. Flach and Vicente, 1989; Newman, 1966). Clearly,
there is much room for improvement.
Figure 1. The single-sensor-single-indicator, or rote instrument, approach to shoe tying. The
example illustrates the need for a smart instrument approach to interface design.
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The alternative to rote instruments is what Runeson (1977) refers to as smart
instruments. These are specialized on a particular type of task in a particular
type of situation. Unlike rote instruments, they cannot be used for a myriad of
purposes. Their great advantage, however, is that they "capitalize on the
peculiarities of the situation and the task" (Runeson, 1977, p. 174). In other
words, smart instruments exploit constraints that exist in a given setting to
measure higher-order properties directly. The example that Runeson gives is
that of a polar planimeter, a device that directly measures the area of of any
two-dimensional figure, regardless of its shape. The device does not use length
at all to arrive at its measurement of area. No calculation, no inferences, and no
knowledge of rules are required for its operation.
Runeson (1977) suggests that perception consists of smart mechanisms that
directly measure complex variables. Some of the advantages of having a smart
perceptual system, rather than a rote one, have already been mentioned above.
There are also evolutionary reasons that give intuitive support to the idea.
Being able to directly pickup goal-relevant properties that are relevant to
survival would seem to be more useful than only being able to measure
fundamental dimensions (e.g., Mass, Length, and Time) and then using these to
painstakingly derive the higher-order properties of interest.
The idea of perception as a set of smart mechanisms is consistent with
Gibson's (1966, 1979) ecological approach to perception (see also Lombardo,
1987; Michaels and Carello, 1981; Reed, 1988; Reed and Jones, 1982; Shaw,
Turvey, and Mace, 1982; Turvey and Shaw, 1979; Turvey, Shaw, Reed, and
Mace, 1981). From this view, organisms are able to directly perceive the
affordances of the environment - the possibilities that it offers them - through a
process of direct attunement, without any need for mediating inferential
processes. In other words, direct perception is made possible by relying on
smart perceptual mechanisms. What makes this possible is the information
about the affordances of the environment. (Note that the meaning of
information, as used in this context, does not imply a symbol system, cf. Turvey
and Kugler, 1984). The lawful, goal-relevant relationships between the
perceptual array and the organism-environment interaction provide information
about affordances. The trademark of a smart instrument is the exploitation of
lawful relationships - in this case, the detection of affordances in the
environment.
The advantages of smart instruments suggest that the approach may be a
useful analogy for interface design. As mentioned earlier, because the goal-
relevant properties of the work environment are not directly available to the
operator's perceptual systems, the interface must serve as the mediator
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between the otherwise unobservable environment and the operator's perceptual
systems. The goal of a smart approach to interface design would be to provide
the information needed for controllability in a form that exploits the power of
perception. Thus, there should be a nesting of invariants in the interface,
thereby allowing the operator to directly perceive the affordances of the work
domain at any level of abstraction. As is the case with the natural environment,
we would like to create a flexible interface that does not constrain operators to
a certain level, but instead, allows them to observe the system at the level
which is most appropriate for the given context (Flach and Vicente, 1989;
Rasmussen and Vicente, in press; Vicente and Rasmussen, 1989). Such a
"smart" approach to interface design would overcome many of the problems
associated with the SSSI approach.
The smart instrument analogy suggests several important questions that
must be addressed if the interface is to serve as an effective mediator:
1. Content - What are the goal-relevant properties of the environment that need
to be measured?
2. Structure - How are these different properties related?
3. Form - What visual form should these properties take?
These questions, which map onto the three dimensions of content, structure,
and form, define the core of the interface design problem.Because these
questions are so central to the concerns of this paper, it is important to delve
into them in more detail. The first question - what properties need to be
measured? - demands an analysis of the objectives of the work domain and the
various means for control that are available for accomplishing those objectives.
Such an analysis will determine which properties of the work domain are
relevant to the operator. These are the properties that should be displayed in
the interface. As already mentioned, SSSI interfaces may fail to provide all of
the goal-relevant information that the operator needs to cope with abnormal
events. Clearly, a more comprehenisve approach is required.
Ecological psychology has developed the notion of an affordance to approach
similar problems (Gibson, 1979). What is needed for interface design is
something equivalent to an analysis of the affordances of the work domain.
That is, designers need to analyze the effectivities of the work domain (i.e., the
available control capabilities) so that they can determine what the work domain
affords. This should enable the designer to construct a set of smart display
elements that measure the goal-relevant variables (cf. Woods, 1986), thereby
providing operators with the action-scaled information (Warren, 1985) they
need to control the system over the entire range of domain demands.
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Conducting a thorough analysis of a work domain's affordances will overcome
the controllability problems associated with the SSSI approach.
The third question - what form should the properties take? - requires a deep
understanding of the operator's perceptual, action, and cognitive capabilities.
To the extent that these are limited, they represent a set of constraints on
interface design. As mentioned above, information in SSSI interfaces is typically
presented in a form that is very difficult for operators to pickup. What is
required is some way of conveying the affordances of the domain in a way that
makes them directly available to the operator's perceptual systems.
Again, ecological psychology has developed a relevant theoretical tool that
addresses this issue. Ecological optics is the analysis of the structure in the
ambient optic array, and in particular, how that structure is specific to the
affordances of the environment (Gibson, 1961). Extrapolating to the present
concerns, the task of the interface designer is actually one of inverse ecological
optics. That is, given an understanding of the human perceptual system, the
designer should use computer technology to make the previously identified
affordances available to the organism in a form that "vision is ready to pickup"
(Gibson, 1979, p. 260) . Providing information which specifies the affordances
of the work domain will allow for direct perception.
Finally, answering the second question - how are the different properties
related? - will provide a basis for organizing the information in the interface.
This is equivalent to determining how the various affordances of the ecosystem
are related. SSSI interfaces group display elements into functional groups, but
do not reveal much of the higher-order domain structure. Revealing the
semantic structure of the work domain in the visual structure of the interface
should make it easier for operators to apprehend the displayed information,
since this is the very information they need for control. Unlike the previous two
questions, however, ecological psychology has not developed a tool for
addressing this problem. In the next section, a framework that is suited for this
problem will be described.
Summary
Understanding how human perception functions has led to some important
insights for interface design. In particular, the discussion suggests that a smart
instrument approach to interface design is needed to supplant the rote
instrument (single-sensor-single-indicator) approach which has dominated
interface design. In addition, several conceptual tools (i.e., affordances and
ecological optics) which can perhaps be meaningfully adapted to the problem of
interface design have been uncovered. This is not to say that ecological
psychology has ready-made answers for these problems. This is certainly not
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the case. The point is that the concepts of affordances and ecological optics can
be used to talk about parallel issues associated with interface content and
form, respectively. However, it is not obvious how, or whether, these concepts
can be used in a prescriptive manner as is required for design.
The one thing which seems to be missing is a format for structuring the
affordances of a work domain. This is a problem that ecological psychology has
yet to approach in a comprehensive manner. Affordances have typically been
studied as single isolated entities (e.g., pass-throughable, sit-onable,
graspable). But in any realistic situation, a large number of inter-related
affordances are available to the active organism. It would be useful to examine
the structure that exists both between and within affordances, since this
structure may convey important goal-relevant information.
Rasmussen (1985a, 1986) has developed a conceptual tool, called a means-
end or abstraction hierarchy, to approach a similar set of problems. In the
following section, the concept of a means-end hierarchy will be described as it
relates to the problems of ecological psychology. While it was originally
developed to describe the functional structure of complex work domains, we will
show how it can also be used to bring out the relationships between the various
affordances of the natural environment.
THE MEANS-END HIERARCHY: A FRAMEWORK FOR COPING WITH
COMPLEXITY
Figure 2 presents a number of the examples that Gibson (1979) used to
illustrate the concept of an affordance. While all of these examples share the
common property of being a possibility for action afforded to the organism by
the environment, there also seem to be differences between some of the
examples as well. Intuitively, some affordances in Figure 2 seem to be more
similar than others. For example, Lifting seems to be more similar to Cutting
than to Nurturing or Survival. The question we would like to pose in this
section is: How are these different affordances related? The goal will be to
describe a framework for organizing affordances into a coherent structure.
Developing A Means-End Hierarchy of Affordances
Where is an appropriate place to start in uncovering the structure among and
between the affordances listed in Figure 2? Hierarchical structures have been
found to be useful in representing complex systems in a variety of different
applications (e.g., Allen and Starr, 1982; Korf, 1987; Mesarovic, Macko, and
Takahara, 1970; Pattee, 1972; Simon, 1981). Thus, a good initial guess would
be to identify different levels of description for ordering affordances. In fact,
1
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Gibson (1979, p. 137) briefly alludes to a hierarchy of affordances, but does not
pursue the idea any further.
Figure 2.A sampling of affordances of the natural environment, taken from Gibson (1979). A
question that has yet to be effectively addressed is: How are these different affordances related?
An immediate problem that arises is that hierarchies come in many different
flavors (cf. Mesarovic et al., 1970). One of the key characteristics distinguishing
different types of hierarchies is the relation between levels. Many different
relations are possible (e.g., spatial scale, temporal scale, authority, flow of
information, etc.). Which is most appropriate for the current context? Given the
view of organisms as goal-directed systems, a means-end relation seems to be
appropriate. What would a "means-end hierarchy" look like, and more
importantly, how useful is it in providing a framework for describing the set of
affordances illustrated in Figure 2?
Figure 3 illustrates some of the relations that can be derived through a
means-end analysis of affordances. Three levels are represented, each
representing three different questions that are crucial to any goal-oriented
system: WHY? WHAT? and HOW? The three levels are not absolute in any
1
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sense, but rather can "slide" up or down (this point will be described in more
detail below). The level at which the observer enters the system defines the
WHAT level. Given this choice, the level above specifies WHY and the level below
specifies HOW. A concrete illustration will help in providing a more intuitive
understanding of this structure.
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WHY?
WHAT?
HOW?
Cooperation Privacy
Playing Locomotion
Swimming,     Crawling,    Walking,   Climbing,   Flying,   Floating
Physical Joy 
Figure 3.Coping with complexity: exploiting a hierarchy of affordances. The figure shows how
there are constraints between affordances, and how the means-end hierarchy can be used to
bring out this structure.
To begin with, take the affordance of Locomotion in Figure 3 as an example.
If, for some reason, an organism was interested in locomoting from point A to
point B, then it would be important to know what means are immediately
available for achieving this goal. As shown in Figure 3, these means are
specified at the level below (i.e., HOW is it possible to locomote?). Possible
means for locomoting include Crawling, Flying, Walking, and Climbing.
Similarly, relevant means for an organism who is interested in playing include
Throwing, Flying, and Climbing.
Returning to the function of Locomotion, possible justifications or reasons for
wanting to locomote are specified at the level above (i.e., WHY would one want
to locomote?). Referring to Figure 3, two reasons for wanting to locomote are
shown: Privacy (e.g., to escape from a crowd) or Cooperation (e.g., if the partner
is on the other side of the pool). Similarly, the act of Playing can be undertaken
to serve the goal of Cooperation. In a sense, these higher order purposes
provide the context for the current affordances of interest.
Several points about the structure shown in Figure 3 are worthwhile pointing
out. First, as mentioned before, the three levels defined by the questions, WHY,
WHAT, and HOW are relative. For instance, if the observer entered the system
at the level of Privacy, then that level would be the WHAT level, and the levels
above and below would be those of WHY and HOW, respectively. Second, it is
also important to note that there can be a many-to-many mapping between
affordances at various levels. Thus, a certain affordance (e.g., Locomotion) can
be fulfilled by a number of different alternatives. Also, a single affordance (e.g.,
Swimming) can be related to more than one higher-order affordance. A third
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feature of the hierarchy is that it represents the constraints that exist on
achieving goals. For example, Throwing is not a meaningful means for achieving
the goal of Locomotion.The most important advantage of adopting such a
format to structure the affordances of an ecosystem is that it provides a
mechanism for coping with complexity (Rasmussen, 1985a). The hierarchy in
Figure 4, consisting of all of the affordances in Figure 2 along with a few others,
illustrates how higher-order affordances can help people to cope with the
complexities inherent in the natural environment (the constraints between
levels, as represented by the links in Figure 3, are omitted for clarity). To avoid
misunderstanding, it is important to note that the hierarchical structure in
Figure 4 does not imply that higher level affordances are constructed by
integrating information from lower levels. Consistent with Gibson's (1979)
position, any of the levels can be directly perceived.
For any given situation, perception of lower-level affordances may be
constrained by the perception of higher-order, value-related affordances. For
example, whether a surface is Swim-overable will be directly relevant if the
current context affords Locomotion, but not if it affords Drinking. The means-
end relation thereby allows people to identify the goal-relevant possibilities with
respect to relations between levels. "The environment is a continuum of
information sources, and to cope with this great variety, the [organism] must be
able to access this information in manageable higher-level structures. This
means that information pickup is an active process that may be organized top-
down in a means-end hierarchy" (Rasmussen, 1986, p. 79).
The important implication of this discussion is that perception of the
situational context in terms of higher-order affordances can help organisms
deal with the complexity of the environment by constraining the number of
meaningful lower-level affordances which are relevant, given the current
context. A means-end hierarchy of affordances reveals emergent goal-relevant
information in the relations between and among affordances that is not
contained at the level of individual affordances.
1
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Value Properties: Purpose, Goal
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Priorities: Abstract Function
Reward Danger Nutrition Manufacture
Cooperation Nurturing Copulation Privacy
Comfort Pain
Context: General Function
Communicating Warmth Drinking Eating
Washing Bathing Injury Support
Fighting Shelter Aiding Punishment
Locomotion
Movement: Physical Process
Sit-on
Climb-on
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Breathing
Throwing
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Carrying
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Walk-on
Obstacle
Lifting
Objects and Background: Physical Form
Layouts Objects Surfaces Substances
Figure 4.Affordances structured within a means-end hierarchy.
Generic Properties
In this section, the generic properties of Rasmussen's means-end hierarchy will
be described in abstract terms. In addition to discussing the nature of the
hierarchy in more detail, the discussion will also draw connections to an
important general class of problems.
First of all, it is important to be precise about the way in which the concept
of hierarchy is being used. The definition of hierarchy that has been adopted
here is based on the treatment provided by Mesarovic et al. (1970), which,
incidentally, differs from the definition used by Turvey, Shaw, and Mace (1978).
The means-end hierarchy belongs to the class of stratified hierarchies described
by Mesarovic et al. (1970, pp. 37-43), the properties of which are listed below.
1. Each stratum, or level, of the hierarchy deals with the very same system, the
only difference being that different strata provide different descriptions, or
different models for observing the system.
2. Each stratum has its own unique set of terms, concepts, and principles.
3. The selection of strata for describing a particular system depends on the
observer, and his knowledge and interest in the control of the system. For
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many systems, however, there may be some strata which appear to be
natural or inherent.
4. The requirements for proper system functioning at any level appear as
constraints on the meaningful operation of lower levels, while the evolution
of the state of the system is specified by the effect of the lower levels on the
higher levels.
5. Understanding of the system increases by crossing levels: by moving up the
hierarchy, one obtains a deeper understanding of system significance with
regard to the goals that are to be achieved, while in moving down the
hierarchy, one obtains a more detailed explanation of the system's
functioning in terms of how those goals can be carried out.
Armed with this description of hierarchy, let us now proceed to the particulars
of the means-end hierarchy and the problems it is meant to address.
An omnipresent problem associated with complex systems, whether it be a
complex work domain or an ecosystem, is what is generically known as the
degrees of freedom problem (e.g., Bernstein, 1967; Saltzman and Munhall,
1989; Turvey, 1977; Turvey et al., 1978). In the case of technical systems, the
problem can be posed as follows: How can an operator with limited resources
decide what actions will lead to the satisfaction of system goals, if the system
consists of so many components with many interactions between them?
Clearly, for resource-bounded agents to be able to deal effectively with such
complexity, they must somehow reduce the dimensionality of their description
of the system of interest.
The means-end hierarchy provides a mechanism for coping with such
complexity. Going up the levels of the hierarchy, there is a selective loss of
detail, and thus problems become more manageable. A formal analysis of the
computational advantages that result from such a hierarchical structure has
been conducted by Korf (1987). However, the loss of detail is not the entire
story. Not any type of hierarchy will do. The critical aspect is the means-end
relation between levels. This relation allows goal-directed organisms to traverse
the hierarchy in a way that will make it possible for them to solve complex
problems. For instance, the organism can observe the system at a higher level
and then decide which part of the system is of greatest relevance to its
immediate goals. By moving down to the next level, the organism can then
consider only the factors that are functionally connected to that part of the
system. In other words, the constraints revealed in the structure of the
hierarchy allow organisms to focus their attention increasingly on the most
appropriate (i.e., goal-relevant) component of the system by "navigating around"
through the various levels of the hierarchy. Due to the complexity of the
system, exhibiting proficient goal-directed behavior would be very difficult -
1
8
perhaps impossible - if the organism had to observe the system at the finest
grain. The level of detail would simply overwhelm the organism's limited
capabilities. While there are cases where such detail is necessary, they
represent a minority.
The means-end hierarchy, then, represents the functional structure of a
system (i.e., the set of constraints on achieving the system's objectives). It has a
simple yet intimate connection to the ecological concepts of affordances and
effectivities: the means available for control are effectivities, and the ends to be
achieved are affordances. Thus, the hierarchy is intended to be a representation
of the inventory of all available means related to all relevant ends and
constraints, seen as boundaries around the acceptable pursuit of the system
goals. It describes the available variety for coping with all relevant situations
(i.e., the possibilities of the system, or requisite variety in the sense of Ashby,
1956). It is similar to the concept of an epistemic ecosystem (cf. Turvey and
Shaw, 1979; Turvey et al., 1978; Shaw and Turvey, 1981) in that it is closed.
When used to represent a work domain, the hierarchy defines the functional
"landscape" (i.e., topology) through which agents will "navigate" during their
work (see Rasmussen, 1986, p. 119 for an example from the domain of
electronic troubleshooting). Individual control trajectories can be mapped onto
the space, but no control trajectory, or even controlling agent is explicitly
represented in the hierarchy.
Summary
In this section, the means-end hierarchy has been introduced as a generic
mechanism that can be used to describe complex, goal-oriented systems with
many degrees of freedom. The framework is relevant to interface design because
it provides a way to structure the properties that are to be represented.
However, we have tried to show that the very same structure can also be
meaningfully adopted to organize the affordances of an ecosystem. The
constraints represented by the mappings between levels of the means-end
hierarchy show how it is that "occasions [i.e, situational contexts] individuate
affordances" (Turvey et al., 1981, p. 299). This development represents a
contribution to the conceptual framework of ecological psychology.
This is not to say that the means-end hierarchy is a mature formalism,
although it has been successfully applied to a variety of domains in cognitive
engineering (e.g., Rasmussen, 1988b; Woods and Hollnagel, 1987). It follows
from this caveat that the affordance structure illustrated in Figure 4 is not
meant to be read as being definitive or "correct". The intention has merely been
to illustrate the properties of the means-end hierarchy, and to point out its
relevance to the questions of ecological psychology. We hope that future work
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will deepen and strengthen the relationships that have been pointed out.
Providing a detailed description of the means-end hierarchy within the
conceptual framework of ecological psychology, as we have done here, is a first
step in this direction.
Other Applications to Ecological Psychology
There are several potential applications or extensions of the means-end
hierarchy that are relevant to ecological psychologists. For one, it would be
useful to try to formalize the framework. A plausible move in this direction
would be to apply dynamics (Abraham and Shaw, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1988) to
quantify the topological properties of the different levels in the means-end
hierarchy. It would also be beneficial to understand the relationship between
the means-end hierarchy and the formalization of an ecosystem as a coalition,
as described by Shaw and Turvey (1981). Such comparative analyses could lead
to the integration of the conceptualizations, or at least, to a better
understanding of how they differ.
It is also likely that the means-end hierarchy can be applied to motor control.
Like an affordance, the concept of a coordinative structure is described
functionally in a goal-specific manner (cf. Greene, 1982; Kugler and Turvey,
1987; Saltzman and Munhall, 1989; Turvey, 1977; Turvey et al., 1978). Given
the insights that were derived from the means-end analysis of affordances, it
would be worthwhile to conduct an analogous investigation to understand how
various coordinative structures are related and constrained. The process of
organizing coordinative structures into a means-end hierarchy should reveal
goal-relevant information that is not apparent when the individual coordinative
structures are viewed in isolation. For instance, the mappings between levels
would specify which lower level coordinative structures could be selected to
implement the functional requirements of the higher level units.
Now that a framework for representing the structure of a complex work
domain has been introduced, it is possible to return to the problem of interface
design.
ECOLOGICAL INTERFACE DESIGN
It is time to assemble the insights that were gathered from the discussions on
smart instruments and the means-end hierarchy and bring them to bear on the
problem of interface design for complex systems. The outcome of this endeavor
is Ecological Interface Design (EID), a theoretical framework for interface design
for complex work domains (Rasmussen and Vicente, 1989; Vicente and
Rasmussen, 1989).
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Different Types of Constraints in Complex Work Domains
The discussion of perceptual instruments suggests that a smart instrument
approach to interface design would be appropriate. As mentioned earlier, the
key to smart instruments is that they exploit constraints. Fortunately, in the
case of complex work domains, there are several different types of constraints
that can be exploited by a "smart" interface. First, there are global constraints,
which are the purposes for which the system was designed. For example, in the
case of a power plant, the global invariants are to produce power and to do so
safely. In addition, there may also be holonomic constraints, or laws, which
describe the functioning of the system. To take the example of the power plant
again, the behavior of the system is governed by the laws of thermodynamics,
which are related to the conservation of energy and mass (cf. Beltracchi, 1989).
Finally, there are also nonholonomic constraints that can be exploited. These
can be thought of as the boundary conditions that are set up by the initial
design of the system (e.g., the number and type of components, the way in
which they are configured, and so on). It is evident, then, that there is a great
deal of structure in these systems, making a smart instrument approach
feasible.
The means-end hierarchy was suggested earlier as a way to represent the
structure of a complex system. In fact, the hierarchy can represent all of the
different types of constraints mentioned in the previous paragraph (i.e., global,
holonomic, and nonholonomic). Furthermore, it can also show how the
constraints are related between levels of the hierarchy. This suggests that the
means-end hierarchy provides a fundamental basis for interface design,
specifying, not only which set of properties should be included in the interface
(i.e, content), but also the relationships between those properties (i.e,
structure). The third and final step would be to present these properties in a
form that is easy to perceive.
Revealing the Domain Constraints in the Interface
In deciding on a visual form, it is important to keep in mind that the
information in the interface can be interpreted in qualitatively different ways
(Rasmussen, 1983). Although the goal is to allow operators to control the
system by relying on perception and action as much as possible, as mentioned
earlier, there will inevitably be times where problem solving activities will be
required to deal with domain demands. Therefore, it is critical that the very
same interface provide information to allow operators to effectively control the
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system in either processing mode (cf. Bødker, 1989; Vicente and Rasmussen,
1989)1.
Summarizing, the goal of EID is twofold: first, to reveal the invariants of the
work domain through the interface in such a way as to take advantage of the
powerful capabilities of perception and action; and second, to provide the
appropriate computer support for the comparatively more laborious process of
problem solving.
The Principles of EID
The EID framework consists of three prescriptive design principles for building
interfaces that satisfy this goal (see Vicente and Rasmussen, 1989 for the
theoretical development of these principles within a cognitive engineering
framework).
1. Use the means-end hierarchy for representing the work domain as a
hierarchy of nested affordances. This representation specifies the content
and structure of the interface, and provides a normative basis for problem
solving.
2. Map the semantics of the ecology onto the geometry of the interface in order
to reveal the affordances of the work domain in a way that exploits direct
perception. The goal here is to "make visible the invisible".
3. To support interaction via the perception-action cycle, operators should be
able to directly act on the display, and the structure of the displayed
information should be isomorphic to the part-whole structure of movements.
Although these principles may seem abstract, this is necessary if the approach
is to be a general one. The intent is to get designers to ask useful questions, not
to provide a "design cookbook" that can be followed by rote. The latter approach
is not feasible since the demands, and therefore the detailed design solutions,
for each domain will be unique. Later in the paper, we will show how these
abstract principles can be instantiated to produce a concrete design product.
Before describing an application, however, several assorted topics which are
pertinent to EID will be discussed. The remainder of this section will be
concerned with: elaborating on the role of action in interface design; discussing
the flexibility of control made possible by EID; the relationship between
                                      
1This requirement implies that there may be tradeoffs involved.  For instance, it may be possible to design an
interface that would exploit perception more effectively, but doing so could perhaps inhibit effective problem
solving.  This would not be an acceptable design, since it is in situations where the operator needs to "go beyond the
information given" that the risk for disaster and the need for help from the computer system both reach a peak.
Thus, it would be preferable to develop an interface that provides better support for problem solving, even if it
means that one has to sacrifice the ease with which it supports perception.  Future research should be directed at
determining whether or not such a tradeoff exists, and if so, how to strike an effective balance between these two
conflicting goals.
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interface design and training; and finally, the connection between direct
perception and EID.
What About Action?
The comparative lack of emphasis that EID places on action may be surprising,
since perception and action are duals of each other. This asymmetry will
become particularly apparent in the example discussed in the following section.
There are at least two reasons for not giving action a more prominent place.
First, comparatively little is known about manual control of systems with very
slow dynamics. The studies that have been performed suggest that, with slow
systems, the importance of the coordinative aspects of movement tends to
diminish and is instead replaced by a greater emphasis on the strategic aspects
associated with discrete control (e.g., Crossman and Cooke, 1974). Second,
issues of action within the context of process control naturally encompass the
engineering domain of control systems design, since the action capabilities of
the system are a joint function of the properties of human manual control and
those of existing automatic control technologies. The interaction between these
two areas has yet to be addressed in a comprehensive manner.
It is worthwhile considering how control systems design can be integrated
with the ideas about interface design expressed in this paper. An obvious
suggestion is that it would be useful to have perception and action occur at the
same level. The EID interface in the example below allows for direct perception
of any level, but control is possible only at the elemental level of physical
components. In the proposed scheme, control of the system could proceed at
any level of the means-end hierarchy. One can envisage a hierarchy of display
screens corresponding to the various levels of the means-end hierarchy (cf.
Goodstein, 1983), and within each screen, perception and action would be
directly coupled at the same level of abstraction. To implement this idea, one
would need to construct a hierarchical control algorithm that would deal with
the degrees of freedom problem associated with implementing a command at a
high level of abstraction. Furthermore, it would also be necessary to design the
automatic controllers so that functions at the same level of abstraction are
decoupled from each other, thereby allowing operators to change one function
without creating an unwanted change in another. This is a tall order since the
many-to-many mapping between levels that typically exists in these systems
makes it likely that some higher-order functions will be coupled at lower levels
of abstraction.
These speculative comments lead to the perhaps surprising conclusion that
the design of automatic controllers for complex, technological systems can
perhaps benefit from psychological considerations, particularly the importance
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of directly coupling perception and action. The strategy of bringing
psychological issues to bear on control systems design was adopted many years
ago, and with great success, within the limited context of vehicular control
systems (cf. Flach, in press a; Wickens, 1986). Although the exact nature of the
issues are different from those encountered in vehicular control, the same
general strategy should be considered within the context of complex work
domains. Interestingly, this idea is also consistent with the view of the design of
the (work) environment as the design of affordances (cf. Gibson, 1982a; Warren,
1985).
Flexibility of Control
The EID approach to interface design has an interesting property with regard to
flexibility of control. Because the interface content is based on the means-end
hierarchy, the operator is free to choose whatever means are available to satisfy
any given function. This contrasts with the traditional human factors approach
to design which is typically based on behavior rather than structure. The
classic approach would be to conduct a task analysis to identify a single
sequence of overt behaviors for performing each task (e.g., Meister, 1985).
Following this philosophy, the design would be optimized for that particular
way of performing the task, but it would not necessarilly support other control
strategies. On the contrary, it may even impede other strategies.
As mentioned earlier, the means-end hierarchy does not have any control
trajectories embedded in it. Thus, operators are free to choose the strategy they
prefer, as long as it is consistent with system goals. An interface based on the
principles of EID will attempt to provide an informational basis for behavior by
representing the set of constraints relevant to the satisfaction of system goals,
but it will also allow the operator to work within his subjective preferences. This
will result in a naturalness of control that is not available from interfaces that
are based on a procedural task analysis. In addition, such a design approach
has the further advantage of providing the flexibility that is required to adapt to
contingencies that cannot be anticipated by the designer (cf. Rasmussen,
1985a). This is a critical requirement in the control of complex work domains.
Learning and Training
In a top-down approach to system design, issues of training and learning go
hand in hand. Therefore, it is important that the respective roles of training and
interface design be clearly specified (cf. Vicente, 1988). The first question which
must be addressed is: What is the population that the interface is being
designed for? In our case, the design is intended for experienced operators of
systems who have gone through rigorous training programs and who use the
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interface in their daily work activities. This simplifies things to a certain extent
since problems associated with periodic use, or negative transfer between
systems are not of great concern.
Another important characteristic of complex work domains that bears on
learning is that there is often a normative basis for system functioning (e.g., the
laws of thermodynamics in the control of a power plant). If the operators are to
exhibit effective control, they must work within the constraints that govern the
behavior of the system they are controlling. Thus, in addition to serving as an
effective mediator, the interface can also play an instructional role by educating
the operator's attention. From this perspective, the interface should allow the
operator to induce effective control strategies through experience. EID attempts
to facilitate induction by making the goal-relevant constraints visible. Through
the learning phase of active, goal-directed exploration, the operator should
gradually pickup on these constraints, and develop appropriate control
strategies (see the example in the next section). Ideally, the interface would
allow the operator to acquire a complete, veridical understanding of system
behavior, merely through extensive practice with controlling the system.
In real systems, however, interface design alone will not do the job. Because
of the sources of complexity mentioned earlier, the operator's attention will also
have to be educated through instruction, not just by experience. This will be
especially critical in fault situations, since the operator will not usually have
prior experience with the particular fault he is faced with. Thus, training
complements interface design by providing operators with a more general
understanding of system functioning that is not tied to the limited set of
situations they have experienced (Vicente, 1988).
Mediated or Direct?
In previous discussions of EID (Rasmussen and Vicente, 1989; Vicente and
Rasmussen, 1989), it has been argued that by following the principles outlined
above, it will be possible to design interfaces that allow operators to rely on
direct perception (see also Flach and Vicente, 1989). However, earlier in the
paper, the interface was described as a mediator. How can perception be direct
if it is mediated by the computer?
The first point that needs to be made is that perception can be more or less
direct (Gibson, 1982b; Mace, 1980). As the opening quote above from Gibson
(1979) indicates, the direct/indirect distinction lies on a continuum. As one
moves along this continuum in the direction of increasing indirectness, the
information available for perception is less rich, and thus, there will be a
greater need for inference. For example, looking at objects that are very far
away via a telescope is indirect in that it does not enable one to explore the
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structure in the optic array, as would be possible if the object was close to the
perceiver. Inference may be needed to compensate for the decrease in
information availability. Apprehension via computers is even more indirect in
that the computer plays the role of a medium. The primary difference between
direct perception via an optic array and apprehension via an ecological interface
is that light as a medium is completely transparent, but the computer is not.
There will always be information specific to the computer's own properties as
an object in the environment distinct from the system being controlled (cf.
Gibson, 1979, pp. 281-283).
The goal of EID then, is to make the computer as transparent as possible,
thereby minimizing the need for inference. Just as the nervous system and the
energy medium are functionally transparent to the properties of the world that
are relevant to the survival of the organism (Shaw and Bransford, 1977), so the
computer interface should be as functionally transparent as possible to the
properties of the work domain that are relevant for effective control (i.e, for the
attainment of system objectives).
The idea is to "make visible the invisible" so as to create the
phenomenological feeling in operators that they are directly controlling the
internal functions of the system, not dealing with a computer intermediary (cf.
Laurel, 1986). This is accomplished through direct specification. The need for
inference is minimized because the interface provides an isomorphic mapping
of the goal-relevant properties. The interesting point is that by achieving direct
specification, the very same interface can be interpreted as a signal for
perceptual-motor control, as a sign triggering an action rule, and as a symbol
for problem solving (Rasmussen, 1983), thereby supporting all modes of
processing that the operator will need to rely on (cf. Vicente and Rasmussen,
1989).
The idea of direct specification can be considered as an example of
apprehension mediated by instruments (Gibson, 1982b). In designing direct
specification instruments, irrelevant information will be left out while goal-
relevant information will be enhanced. An example is perception in the dark via
infra-red goggles. Certain invariants in the optical array are preserved (e.g.,
shape of objects), whereas others (e.g., color) are not.
An important implication associated with apprehension mediated by
instruments is that: "the reality testing that accompanies the pickup of natural
information is missing .... The invariants have already been extracted. You have
to trust the original perceiver" (Gibson, 1979, p. 261). In the case of
apprehension via ecological interfaces, it would be more appropriate to say:
"You have to trust the designer". That is, informative perception mediated by
instruments is only possible if the designer has constructed the instrument in
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such a way that it conveys the intended invariants (e.g., consider the knowledge
that must go into designing an electron microscope). In the case of interface
design, the extraction of the invariants in the work domain is performed
analytically beforehand by the designer and then built into the interface
geometry. Thus, there are a fixed number of properties that the operator is
receiving information about.
It follows that there are some properties which are not being conveyed. There
may be some situations (e.g., a fault causing a structural change in the system)
where new properties that are not represented in the existing interface may
become relevant to the control of the system. As an example, if one were tying
one's shoes with the SSSI interface in Figure 1 and one of the laces broke, the
property of lace tension would be helpful in diagnosing the "fault". But this
property was not considered by the designer as being relevant to system goals,
and therefore is not available in the interface. Kugler and Lintern (1989) provide
an interesting discussion based on the concepts of self-organization that could
potentially address the issue of designing interfaces that cope with the
emergence of novel, goal-relevant properties.
 It should be pointed out, however, that adopting the means-end hierarchy as
a basis for determining which properties need to be represented in an interface
should allow operators to control the system under abnormal conditions. The
reason for this is that, regardless of the nature of the abnormality, the set of
means (effectivities) available for coping with the fault is bounded by the initial
design of the system, and by the holonomic invariants (i.e., laws), both of which
are represented in the means-end hierarchy. Because the holonomic invariants
(e.g., the conservation of mass and energy) always hold, they provide a basis for
control in abnormal situations.
Summary
In this section, the principles of EID have been described. In addition, issues
associated with the role of action, flexibility in control, training and learning,
and direct perception have been discussed as they pertain to EID. These are
factors that need to be taken into account in a comprehensive approach to
system design.
AN APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES
In this section, the principles that were described above will be illustrated
within the context of a thermal-hydraulic process control system. While the
interface developed below will serve as the basis for experiments evaluating the
EID framework, it should not be taken as a final product, but rather as an
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initial prototype. It is likely that an empirical evaluation will reveal how the
form of the interface can be improved.
It is important to note, however, that the content of the interface is not
subject to empirical evaluation. The reason for this is that interface content
can, and should, be evaluated analytically (Rasmussen, 1985b; Vicente, 1990).
The role of experimentation is to determine how that information should be
revealed (i.e., what form it should take). Thus, rather than illustrating a
definitive design, the purposes of the example are: first, to show that the
principles of EID can be instantiated for a given domain; and second, to point
towards the need for more research on principle-driven design for direct
specification.
The Ecology of DURESS
DURESS (DUal REservoir System Simulation) is a thermal-hydraulic process
simulation, to be used as a research vehicle (Vicente, 1987). If the findings of
basic research are to generalize to real world systems, it is imperative that the
simulation have a minimum degree of complexity. While it does not embody the
full complexity of an actual work domain, DURESS is considerably more
complex than the tasks that have traditionally been adopted for basic
laboratory research.
DURESS represents several of the factors that make real-world problem
solving difficult (cf. Woods, 1988). First, the system is dynamic, with time lags
on all of the control variables. Thus, there is a considerable delay before the
effects of control actions result in a visible change in system state. In addition,
effects also take some time to propagate to different parts of the system.
Second, DURESS also has couplings between subsystems. In some situations,
this puts a burden on the operator to cope with multiple, competing goals (see
below). Third, there is also a degree of risk since the reservoirs can be damaged
by heating them while they are empty. Damage can also be encurred by
allowing the water to spill from the reservoirs. As a result of its complexity,
DURESS poses, on a much smaller scale, many of the demands that designers
of high-tech systems are likely to face. It serves, therefore, as a challenging
context for testing the principles of EID.
The physical structure of DURESS is illustrated in Figure 5. The system
consists of two redundant feedwater streams that can be configured to supply
water to two reservoirs, or vats. The operator's goals are to keep each of the
reservoirs at a prescribed temperature (40 °C and 20 °C), and to maintain
enough water in each reservoir to satisfy each of the current externally
determined demand flow rates. To do this, the operator has control over six
valves, two pumps, and two heaters. The diagram representation format
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illustrated in Figure 5 has often been adopted as a basis for interface design.
Our contention is that such an interface format is not very effective in
supporting operators in coping with the entire range of control demands that
they are likely to face (e.g. normal operations, startup, shutdown, and
disturbances). The reason for this is that the interface in Figure 5 represents
the relational structure at the level of physical anatomy, whereas process
operation has to be planned at the level of functional relations. This point
perhaps can be made more obvious by developing an ecological interface for
DURESS.


VA
10
0
VA1
10
0
VA2
10
0
VB1
10
0
VB2
10
0
20
0



D2 50
0
T2
100
0
Reservoir 2 (20 C)
V2
20
0


D1 50
0
T1
100
0



Reservoir 1 (40 C)
V1





VB
10
0


0                   10


0                   10
HTR1




PA
ON
PB
ON
HTR2
Figure 5.A physical diagram interface for DURESS.
Describing the Affordances of the Ecology
The first step in designing an ecological interface is to represent the affordances
of the work domain. For this purpose, EID adopts the means-end hierarchy. As
mentioned before, this hierarchical domain representation specifies the content
and structure of the interface. While not explicitly described below, the various
levels of the means-end hierarchy can also be decomposed along a part-whole
hierarchy. The part-whole dimension allows operators to view a given level at
different grains of resolution (see the example of the two feedwater streams
described at the level of Physical Function below).
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Figure 6 illustrates the means-end hierarchy for one reservoir. It should be
noted that the system's dynamic equations provide a formal description of the
qualitative structure represented in the figure. At the top level of Functional
Purpose, the higher level objectives of the domain are specified: to keep the
water in each temperature at criterion, and to keep enough water in each
reservoir to satisfy the respective output demand. While not explicitly
represented, there are also constraints on how these objectives are to be met
(e.g. avoid spilling or boiling water, do not damage any components, etc.).
FUNCTIONAL
PURPOSE
ABSTRACT
FUNCTION
GENERALIZED
FUNCTION
PHYSICAL
FUNCTION
Mass Balance
Energy Balance
Satisfy
Current Demand
Keep Water 
Desired Temp
Mass
Inventory
Mass
Source
Mass
Sink
Energy
Source I Energy
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Energy
Sink
Energy
Source II
Cooling and
Water Source
Heat and
Water Store
Heat a
Water 
Heat Source
Heater
Reservoir
Feedwater
Stream I
Feedwater
Stream II
Curre
Dema
Figure 6.A means-end hierarchy representation of DURESS showing the relationships within
levels of the hierarchy.
It is possible to describe the levels of the means-end hierarchy in ecological
terms. For instance, the level of Functional Purpose represents the higher-order
affordances of the domain. Each of DURESS' reservoirs affords the supply of
water at a certain temperature. The level below will specify the effectivities (i.e.,
the means) that are available for control. This relationship (means -> end, or
affordance -> effectivity) holds between each pair of adjacent levels in the
hierarchy.
At the second level, Abstract Function, the causal structure of the system is
described according to first principles; in this case, conservation of mass and
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energy. Thus, at this level DURESS is represented in terms of its mass and
energy topology. For the mass balance, there are three variables: the rate at
which mass is flowing into the reservoir (source), the rate at which mass is
flowing out of the reservoir (sink), and the current mass inventory, as reflected
by volume. The energy topology is similar, the only difference being that there
are two energy sources, the incoming water and the heater.
At the level of Generalized Function, DURESS can be described in terms of
several standard heating and liquid flow functions that instantiate the mass
and energy topology specified above. Thus, in the energy flow, there is a heating
source, a cooling source, a means for removing heat, and a means for storing
heat. In the mass flow, there is a means for adding water, a means for removing
water, and a means for storing water. At this level, we see that the energy and
mass flows are actually coupled: the source of water is also a cooling source;
the means for storing water is also a means of storing energy; and the means of
removing water is also a means of removing energy.
At the level of Physical Function, the system is described in terms of the
components that realize the functions specified at the level above. These are the
variables the operator has control over. Due to space restrictions, the feedwater
streams are represented as a whole in Figure 6, but a more comprehensive
representation would decompose each stream into its constituent components
(i.e., three valves and one pump) along a part-whole dimension. While not
explicitly shown in Figure 6, at this level we also note that the two reservoirs
are coupled by the redundant feedwater streams. Either feedwater stream can
be configured to feed either reservoir.
The level of Physical Form is not shown in Figure 6 because it is similar to
the level of Physical Function. The difference is that whereas Physical Function
specifies the settings and causal relationships between components, Physical
Form specifies the spatial layout and appearance of those very same
components.
Whereas Figure 6 illustrates the relationships within levels of the means-end
hierarchy representation, Figure 7 shows the relationships between levels.
These mappings between levels reveal some important structural system
properties. There are three properties, in particular, that are worth noting.
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Figure 7.The mappings between the levels of the means-end hierarchy for DURESS.
First, the mappings between Functional Purpose and Abstract Function
indicate that the temperature goal is connected to both the energy and mass
balances. The reason for this is that temperature is defined as energy per unit
mass. In contrast, the volume goal is only connected to the mass balance. In
practical terms, this implies an inter-goal constraint (Woods and Hollnagel,
1987). Making a change in the mass flow topology to affect volume may have
the unintended side effect of changing temperature. Given the goals of the
system, this is an unavoidable fact. It results from the fact that one of the goal
variables (temperature) has the other goal variable (volume) as one of the
factors that enters into its definition.
A second property of interest results, not from a fundamental consideration,
but from the particular physical configuration that was selected for the system.
In particular, there is a many-to-one mapping between Abstract Function and
Generalized Function. There are several instances where a single subsystem is
a means for controlling both the mass and energy balances. For instance, each
feedwater stream serves as both a source of mass and a source of energy. Thus,
there is a structural coupling between the mass and energy configurations.
Note that these couplings would not exist if separate components were
implemented to instantiate the mass and energy balances.
The third structural property is similar. Figure 7 indicates that there is a
many-to-one mapping between Physical Function and Generalized Function.
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This is because either feedwater stream can be used to supply either vat. In
other words, there is an indirect coupling between vats via the feedwater
streams. This means that changing the settings of the valves or pump in one
stream to control the amount of water flowing into one of the vats could
actually inadvertently affect the flowrate to the second reservoir. Of course, this
problem could be eliminated if each feedwater stream served only one vat, but
then the capability to deal with faults would be removed. The benefit of having
two redundant streams is that, in the case of a fault in one stream (e.g., a
blocked valve or pump), the system can be reconfigured so that the other
stream supplies water to both of the vats. In this way, the system will still be
able to function as desired.
It is important to understand how these last two features of the system are
related to the first one discussed above. The three are similar in terms of their
practical implications: changing the setting of one component may have
unintended side effects. However, the properties differ in terms of their origin.
The first property is unavoidable (given the current Functional Purpose)
because it has a fundamental basis, whereas the other two are, in principle at
least, avoidable because they result from specific design decisions.
The preceding discussion reveals how the means-end hierarchy can provide
some important insights into the structure of DURESS. Some other properties
of the hierarchy itself will be illustrated by making specific reference to Figures
6 and 7. One interesting property is that faults propagate upward in the
hierarchy. Thus, referring to Figure 7, if there is a leak in the vat, this causes a
disturbance in the heat and water store, which in turn is reflected by changes
in the mass and energy inventories, ultimately jeopardizing the achievement of
the higher level goals. Reasons for proper system functioning are derived top-
down in the hierarchy. To take two examples, the heater element exists to
supply heat, and the mass and energy topology has been designed to satisfy the
functional purposes of the system. Finally, the relations within levels of
abstraction shown in Figure 6 provide information as to what will happen when
certain changes are made (e.g., increasing the mass source flow rate will
increase the mass inventory gradient).
To summarize, the means-end hierarchy representation of DURESS
illustrates the various layers of functional structure that are inherent in the
domain. Since it describes the way the system actually functions, this
representation can be viewed as a normative model of the system (i.e., it
specifies the way the operator should think of the system during problem
solving), thereby providing a fundamental basis for interface design.
3
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Figure 8.Making visible the invisible: mapping the relational structures of the work domain
onto the geometrical properties of the interface.
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Making the Affordances Visible
The next step in building an EID interface is to embed the means-end hierarchy
structure into the interface. One can think of this phase as making visible the
otherwise unobservable goal-relevant properties of the domain. Whereas
traditional ecological optics is concerned with analyzing the information in the
environment underlying the evolution of the visual system, the goal here is to
reveal the process constraints in a form that is directly compatible with the
visual system. According to the principles of EID, this is accomplished by
mapping the relational structures of the domain, represented by the system's
dynamic equations, onto the visible geometric properties of the interface
objects. Figure 8 illustrates how this has been accomplished for DURESS.
In Figure 8A, the state equation describing the mass balance is given. This
equation describes a relationship between a set of variables, and thus can be
considered a form of domain knowledge. Following the goal of making visible
the invisible, a geometric figure was developed to represent perceptually the
relational structures specified by the state equation. As a result, there is an
isomorphic mapping between the geometry of the trapezoid and the
relationships between the variables describing the mass balance. Since the
general form of the energy balance equation is very similar to that of the mass
balance equation, a mapping similar to that shown in Figure 8A can also be
developed for the energy balance.
Figure 8B represents the algebraic equation relating the temperature of the
water in the reservoir, the energy contained therein, and the reservoir volume.
Again, a geometric figure was developed to illustrate the relationships specified
by the equation. The result is an isomorphic mapping between the
trigonometric relationships describing the geometry of the triangle and the
algebraic equation describing the behavior of the system.
The key behind these mappings is that they translate the constraints
inherent in the domain into constraints on the interface geometry. This is
equivalent to embedding knowledge about the domain in the interface. The
great advantage of providing an externalized representation of the domain
constraints in the interface is that it unburdens the operator's memory
(Kotovsky, Hayes, and Simon, 1985). For example, rather than having to
remember and retrieve the relationship describing the mass balance from
memory, the operator can rely on the interface to provide this information.
Making visible the invisible, then, allows operators to control the system by
relying more on the powerful capabilities of perception and action than on
comparatively more effortful and error-prone inferential processes.
The product of the design process up until this point is shown in Figure 9.
Information at every level of the means-end hierarchy is included. Beginning at
3
5
the top level of Functional Purpose, the demand (D1, D2) and temperature (T1,
T2) setpoints are represented in the interface. For the temperature settings, the
upper and lower limits around the setpoints (40 °C and 20 °C) are shown as
vertical lines on the two temperature scales (T1 and T2, respectively). The level
of Abstract Function is represented by the group of graphics on the right. This
portion of the display will be discussed in greater detail below. At the level of
Generalized Function, the flowrates in each feedwater stream (e.g., FVA, FPA,
FA1, FA2) and the heating rates (e.g., HTR1) are displayed as bar scales. At the
level of Physical Function, the valve settings (e.g., VB) and heater settings (e.g.,
HTR2) are indicated by the small triangular pointers on the respective scales.
Since the pump settings (e.g., PB) are discrete (either ON or OFF), they are
directly labelled on the pumps themselves. Finally, at the level of Physical
Form, the relative spatial layout of the components and the connections
between them are also represented.
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Figure 9.An EID interface for DURESS. See text for description.
With regard to the level of Abstract Function, the rectangular graphic on the
left represents the mass balance for the reservoir, while the graphic on the right
represents the energy balance. Both operate in a similar manner, as defined by
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the mapping function in Figure 8A. Referring to Reservoir 1, the various inputs
are shown at the top (e.g., MI1 for the mass and EI1 for the energy), the
inventories on the side (e.g., V1 for volume, or mass, and E1 for energy), and
the outputs at the bottom (e.g., D1 for demand, or mass, and EO1 for energy).
The energy inputs (EI1 and EI2) are partialled out according to the two
contributors. Thus, the energy added by the feedwater is shown as the lightly
shaded bar, while the energy added by the heater is shown as the dark bar.
Intuitively, these energy and mass graphics rely on a funnel metaphor. Thus,
if the bottom is wider than the top (i.e., output greater than input, as is the
case with the mass balance for Reservoir 1 in Figure 9), then it is easy to
visualize the consequence, namely that the volume should be decreasing. Thus,
the slope of the line represents the rate at which the mass (or energy) inventory
is changing (see Figure 8A). If input equals output, then the line would be
perpendicular, indicating that the inventory should not change.
The graphic in the middle, between the mass and energy balances, illustrates
the structure of the relationship between volume, energy, and temperature,
following the mapping in Figure 8B. The horizontal line with a ball on the end
that emanates from the current volume level is of fixed length. The height of
this line always accompanies any change in volume (i.e., the bar will always be
at the same height as the water level, V1 or V2). The thick diagonal line in the
center display is always tangent to the ball on the edge of the horizontal line.
Thus, a change in the vertical position of the horizontal line serves to change
the slope of the line in the center display. For example, if volume increases, the
horizontal line goes up, causing the diagonal to rotate counterclockwise, and
thereby increasing the slope of the diagonal line. The slope of the diagonal
represents the function that maps the amount of energy onto temperature (see
Figure 8B). This mapping is indicated by the line from the energy inventory (E1,
E2) that comes across and reflects off the diagonal and down onto temperature
(T1, T2).
To summarize, the interface in Figure 9 has exploited the mappings
described in Figure 8 to make all of the process dynamics visible to the
operator. Whereas the interface in Figure 5 included information at the levels of
Functional Purpose, Physical Function, and Physical Form, the EID interface in
Figure 9 also includes the levels of Generalized Function and Abstract
Function, thereby representing the entire means-end hierarchy.
Coupling Perception and Action
The final principle of EID is concerned with action. What means does the
interface provide for the operator to control the system? EID suggests that,
whenever possible, commands should be communicated by directly acting on
3
7
the display - the familiar idea of direct manipulation (Shneiderman, 1983). The
intent here is to close the perception-action loop, thereby taking advantage of
skilled motor control. As an example, to change the setting of the components
in the EID interface in Figure 9 (e.g., VA, or HTR1), it is sufficient to "drag" the
setpoints (represented as small triangles along the scales for the heaters and
valves) to the new value using a mouse or a trackball. For the pumps, a change
in state is achieved by merely clicking on the pump icon itself. Adopting a direct
manipulation design is preferable to having the operator giving commands via
abstract, and often awkward, command languages, as is common in some word
processors.
In more complex systems, it may also be necessary to have a direct mapping
between the perceptual hierarchy of nested display elements and the hierarchy
of aggregated patterns of movement that is characteristic of skilled behavior (cf.
Vicente and Rasmussen, 1989). An example of a display with these properties is
discussed in Rasmussen and Vicente (in press).
A Few Scenarios
To give a more intuitive feel for how the interface would function dynamically,
consider how several situations reveal themselves in the EID interface for
DURESS. Take the simple case of a fault in one of the pumps. For example,
what would happen if pump VB2 were to become blocked? This fault would be
easy to diagnose with the interface in Figure 9, since there would be no flow
through the valve (i.e., FB2 would go to zero) in spite of the fact that the valve
setting, VB2, is open.
The higher order structure in the EID interface also allows operators to focus
their attention by zooming in on the relevant part of the system. For instance,
say there was an unexpected deviation in the temperature of Reservoir 1 (T1). If
this deviation was due to a change in the slope of the diagonal line, then the
operator should focus on the mass balance. If the diagonal did not change, then
the operator could focus on the energy balance. Let us assume that the latter
was the case. Now the question becomes: Was the unexpected change in energy
inventory due to a change in the inputs (EI1) or the output (EO1)? Again, the
structure of the information in the interface allows one to branch to the
relevant subset of the system. Assuming that the change was in the inputs, one
can then also determine which of the two inputs was responsible for the
change.
The line of reasoning that was followed for this hypothetical scenario exploits
the constraints represented by the means-end hierarchy in Figure 7. The fact
that all of this information is represented in the interface allows operators to
consider the system at a high level where the system description is simpler
3
8
(e.g., whether system goals are currently achieved or not), and then gradually
navigate down the hierarchy to identify the cause of the abnormality. This
example illustrates how the means-end hierarchy provides a mechanism for
coping with the complexity of the domain.
Finally, the EID interface should also serve an instructional role by helping
operators learn about the characteristics of the system. For instance, one of the
properties that needs to be taken into account in controlling DURESS is the
unidirectional coupling between the volume and temperature goals. As
mentioned earlier, changing volume may result in an inadvertent change in
temperature, but the reverse is not true. Thus, it would be best to concentrate
on the mass balance first so as to stabilize the volume, and then worry about
the temperature goal. If one were to start with the energy balance and get the
temperature at the setpoint, and then go on to manipulate volume, the latter
would move the temperature from the desired value. The operator would then
have to go back to the heater to get the temperature back to the setpoint again.
In an empirical study with a structurally similar system, Moray, Lootsteen, and
Pajak (1986) found that most subjects caught on to the strategy of
concentrating on volume first after 12 trials of controlling the system.
With the EID interface, operators should pick up on this more quickly.
Stabilizing the mass balance first will fix the slope of the thick diagonal line in
the center. Achieving the correct temperature is then easily accomplished by
manipulating the heater until the energy inventory (E1, or E2) bounces off the
diagonal and onto the acceptable region on the temperature scale. On the other
hand, achieving the temperature setpoint first, and then going on to work on
the mass balance will result in a change in volume, which in turn, would
change the slope of the diagonal. This would then cause the temperature to
deviate from the setpoint, requiring the operator to manipulate the heater once
again to get the appropriate temperature. The fact that the domain constraints
are revealed in the interface should make it easier for the operator to pick up on
the structural system properties which need to be taken into account for
effective control.
This discussion of how the EID interface for DURESS would react in different
types of scenarios shows how this interface provides a much richer source of
information than the interface illustrated in Figure 5.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have attempted to illustrate, first, how EID is consistent with
the premises of ecological psychology, and second, how the EID framework can
be put to practical use to develop a final design product. While there are many
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reasons to believe that the ecological interface illustrated in Figure 9 represents
a considerable improvement over traditional interfaces, only an experimental
evaluation can confirm this intuition. An evaluation is currently being
conducted to provide an empirical test of a subset of the EID framework within
the context of DURESS (cf. Vicente, Flach, and Sanderson, 1989).
A question which remains to be addressed is the relevance and applicability
of these ideas to real, complex human-machine systems. EID is directed at real-
world problems, and therefore, it is critical that its principles generalize beyond
domains that are used in laboratory research. In this regard, it is encouraging
to note that Beltracchi (1987, 1989) has developed an overview display for
nuclear power plants, based on the Rankine cycle heat engine, that is
consistent with the ideas behind EID. The fact that this display has been
implemented in an actual plant and has been positively received by operators
(Lindsay and Staffon, 1988), suggests that the general principles of EID can be
instantiated in real complex domains to produce effective mediators between
operators and their work environment.
It is important to realize that EID is directed at a significant and pressing
applied problem. While one would think that the problem of interface design for
complex systems would have been "solved" by this point, it has actually yet to
be addressed in an effective manner. Recently, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission convened a workshop, attended by a number of experts in several
fields, to identify important research issues associated with interface design for
complex human-machine systems (DeBor and Swezey, 1989). Several of the
research topics that were identified as being of general and immediate
importance are directly addressed by the research program centered around the
EID framework (cf. Vicente, Flach, and Sanderson, 1989). Importantly, EID is a
principled approach to the problem, since it has foundations in basic research
in both cognitive engineering (Rasmussen, 1974, 1983, 1985a, 1986) and basic
psychology (Gibson, 1966, 1979). The EID framework thus represents a
coherent approach to a significant practical problem.
On a more general note, this paper has attempted to point to some of the
similarities between cognitive engineering and ecological psychology.
Interestingly, the parallels between the two disciplines can be traced to a
common metatheoretical orientation. The ecological approach has many
similarities with systems theory (cf. Lombardo, 1987, pp. 327-329). Gibson
(1979, p. 2) himself explicitly referred to this connection. The discipline of
cognitive engineering has been developed within a systems engineering
framework as well (cf. Hollnagel and Woods, 1983; Norman, 1981; Rasmussen,
1986). Thus, even though the two disciplines are concerned with a very
different set of problems, the way in which they approach those problems is
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very similar, one could almost say identical. To the extent that the problems of
the two areas share common generic solutions, the disciplines will benefit from
interacting with one another.
The message that we would like to leave in closing is that the set of issues
that is faced in designing information systems for complex work domains
provides a mine of challenges, as well as opportunities, for ecological
psychology (cf. Flach, 1989, in press b). There is one point in particular that is
worthwhile emphasizing, since it has the greatest potential for influencing
ecological psychology. There are certain classes of problems that must be
continually faced in complex work domains which simply do not exist in
navigating and locomoting in the natural environment. As mentioned in the
introduction, the characteristics of these complex systems impose a set of
demands that require that the operator engage in problem solving (i.e., going
beyond the information given). However, as Jenkins (1989) has pointed out, the
ecological community has tended to focus on perception and action to the
detriment of cognition. A greater emphasis on the study of cognition seems
warranted if the ecological approach is to provide a comprehensive account of
human behavior.
The key point is that the type of applied problems discussed in this paper
can encourage such a development. Given the overlap in perspectives that
already exists between ecological psychology and cognitive engineering, complex
work domains offer themselves as a natural, yet challenging, testbed for posing
basic research questions, which can, in turn, lead to new developments in
ecological psychology. Therefore, just as Gibson's involvement with the applied
concerns of driving (Gibson and Crooks, 1938) and flying (Gibson, 1947) led
him to a revolutionary theory of perception (cf. Lombardo, 1987; Reed, 1988),
the challenges of complex work domains can also serve as the catalyst for a
new ecological theory of cognition.
There is little doubt that an interaction between the ecological psychology
and cognitive engineering communities is bound to be fruitful. While there are a
few small steps being taken in this direction (e.g., Flach, 1989, in press b; Flach
and Vicente, 1989; Kirlik, 1989; Kugler, 1989; Kugler and Lintern, 1989;
Moray, 1989; Rasmussen and Vicente, 1989; Vicente and Rasmussen, 1989;
Woods, 1989), for the most part, cognitive engineering is still an unexplored
ecological frontier.
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